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estimates the prospective benefits of using a limit order versus a market order that immediately executes against the prevailing opposing quote. Such a choice typically confronts an agent who is precommitted to trade, such as a trader who must sell the asset by the close of the day's trading to fund a debt obligation. To avoid the selection bias that would result from dropping unexecufed limit orders from the sample, we assume that a failed or canceled limit order is replaced by a market order.
The Empirical work on order strategies is still relatively nascent. Bronfman (1991) presents a characterization of one day's order flow for the NYSE. Petersen and Fialkowski (1994) examine a sample of market orders for two days, and describe intermarket differences in execution performance. Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995) analyze order flows in the Paris Bourse, and characterize the determinants of order submission and price placement. Handa and Schwartz (1991) impose simulated limit order strategies on actual transaction price and quote realizations, thereby constructing a random sample of hypothetical limit orders. This approach assumes, however, that the stock price path is not affected by the submission or execution of the simulated order. Because the present sample consists of actual orders, it may be more realistic. This paper is also related to the literature on transaction cost measurement, surveyed in Beebower (1989) and Harris (1990) . Most of these studies focus on realized trades, however. Perold (1988) notes that this ignores the cost of foregone trades. By focusing on orders and imputing a cost of execution failure, the present analysis attempts to remedy this defect. Blume and Goldstein (1993) and Lee (1993) present comparative market stud?
ies based on price improvement, defined as the difference between a transaction price and the prevailing quote. This quantity is similar to our ex ante performance measure. The price improvement calculation, however, assumes that the disadvantaged party in the transaction is a market order trader. Such an assumption is unnecessary in the present study because we observe the orders underlying the transaction. On the other hand, because our order sample comprises only NYSE submissions, it does not support intermarket comparisons.
Using a sample of actual NYSE orders, we compute averages of ex ante and ex post order performance measures.
The results show that when limit orders are classified by their price relative to the quote prevailing at the time of order submission, the orders that display the best performance are also the orders that are most frequently submitted. The results further suggest that if a trader passively places limit orders, and then (upon execution) actively attempts to reverse the initial trade, losses are likely to result. That is, off-floor traders cannot profitably operate as quasi-dealers in competition with the specialist and other floor traders.
We condition our analysis only on spread, order size, and order direction (buy or sell), and within each classification cell, we rely on unconditional means of our performance measures.
We do not know the ultimate objectives, the complete strategies, and the full information sets associated with the orders. This means that we may be assessing the outcomes of strategies that are, given actual objectives and information sets, suboptimal. Real world traders may surpass our performance estimates. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes our empirical approach. Section III discusses order handling at the NYSE and the characteristics of our data. Section IV describes the main results. A brief summary concludes the paper in Section V.
II. Empirical Methods

A.
Description of Strategies
For present purposes, an order strategy is defined by the choice of market or limit order, and (if a limit order) the limit price position. Denote the bid and ask quotes prevailing at the time of order submission as q^ and q^. The limit price position is defined as the limit price relative to the prevailing quote on the same side of the order,
(limit price) ? q^, for a buy order ^sub ~~ (limit price), for a sell order L measures the "aggressiveness" of the limit order, the extent to which it betters the existing quote. A limit buy order at the current bid price has L = $0. Such orders will be referred to as at-the-quote orders. Limit orders away from the market have L < $0. As defined, L is a notational convenience that normalizes the limit price relative to the quotes and direction of the order. Marketable limit orders (those priced to meet or better the opposing quote) are essentially similar to a market order. We group these orders with market orders for reporting purposes, and comment on the differences in the discussion of the results.
B. Performance Measures
In the spirit of the transactions cost literature cited in the introduction, this paper measures order performance by comparing the actual or imputed fill price with a nearby market price that serves as a benchmark. The benchmark price need not correspond to an actual transaction price because order strategies are compared to each other, not to the benchmark. In this paper, we compare the fill price to a nearby quote.
Ex Ante Performance Measure
Our ex ante measure takes as a reference price the opposite-side quote prevail?
ing at the time the order was submitted. For an order that executes at the average fill price pm, our ex ante performance measure is {#cf,h ? Pm, for a buy order
Pfill-#sub> for a sell order
Use of the opposite-side quote establishes a comparison to a hypothetical market order that executes against the quote.
For orders not completely filled due to expiration or cancellation, a fill price does not actually exist. These orders cannot be dropped from the sample because they embody the very real costs of foregone trades. While these costs cannot be accurately measured without detailed knowledge of the individual trader's situa? tion, it is common to impute a cost. Handa and Schwartz impute a fill to these orders at a future price, and we follow this approach. Specifically, we impute to the canceled portion of an order a fill at the opposite-side quote prevailing at the time of cancellation. For example, a canceled buy order is assumed to have been filled at the seller's quote (the prevailing ask).
This implicitly assumes a strategy in which a canceled order is immediately resubmitted as a market order that executes against the opposite-side quote. While possessing the virtue of simplicity, this practice almost certainly exaggerates the penalty associated with execution failures. The fact that only a fraction of all canceled orders are actually resubmitted indicates that many limit order traders are passive in the sense that they are only willing to trade at their price. Accordingly, this measure is most appropriate for precommitted traders who use limit orders to lower the cost of trades that they intend to complete under most circumstances. This computation also overstates the true economic loss because market orders often execute at prices more favorable than the opposite-side quote.
Expired orders are handled in a similar fashion. An expired buy order is assumed filled at the closing ask price; an expired sell order at the closing bid. This practice implicitly assumes that the limit order trader is willing to forego immediacy only up to the close ofthe day's trading. As with canceled orders, this approach probably overstates the actual opportunity cost of the foregone trade.
The ex ante measure reflects the concerns of an agent who is precommitted to trade. For a market order, the fill price reflects an actual execution in virtually all instances, and Pex ante reflects the extent to which this price betters the oppositeside quote, a quantity often termed "price improvement." For a limit order that is priced away from the market, the ex ante measure will be positive if the order executes, but will be generally negative otherwise (due to the imputed fill when the market has moved away from the limit price).
Ex Post Performance Measure
For orders that are completely filled, we compare the fill price to a market price prevailing after the execution. Our ex post performance measure is defined relative to ^|jf+5 and qf^+5, the bid and ask quotes prevailing five minutes after the order is filled, 
C. Analysis Design
The paper examines the two order performance measures in subsamples con? structed by prevailing spread, order size, strategy (market vs. limit, limit price position), and side (buy or sell). In comparing subsamples that differ only in strat? egy, we attribute any differences to strategy. For example, consider all orders of 200 or fewer shares submitted when the prevailing spread was $%. In comparing the mean values of Pex ante for market orders and limit orders submitted at the quote, any difference is attributed to order choice. We base our normative statements concerning the relative merits ofthe two strategies on these comparisons.
This approach possesses the virtue of simplicity, but is subject to certain lim? itations and qualifications.
Most identifying information. The limit order book ("the book") consists of all active limit orders arrayed in descending price for buys and in ascending price for sells.
Executed limit orders and cancellations are removed from the book, and new sub? missions are added. The specialist is the agent for limit orders: he is responsible for maintaining the book and representing the orders to the market.
Within the limit order book, price priority is strictly enforced. At a given price, orders are generally executed in the sequence in which they were received, although preference may be given to orders large enough to satisfy a particular counterparty order. It is important to note, however, that the limit order book may compete at times with the trading crowd (brokers physically present at the post). Furthermore, although most executed limit orders are filled at the submitted limit price, that price may be bettered on occasion. When a block is crossed at a price better than the price of an existing limit order, for example, these orders may be "cleaned up" at the block price. A market order demands immediate execution at the best available price.
Market orders are often stopped: the specialist guarantees a price for the order (generally, the prevailing opposing quote), but endeavors to execute the order at a better price later. The originator of the order is immediately notified of the stop, but there is no print on the transaction tape until the order is actually executed.
Specialists use stops to pair off opposing market orders and to maintain price continuity (Hasbrouck, Sofianos, and Sosebee (1993)).
B. Data Sources
The data are drawn from the NYSE's TORQ (Trades, Orders, Reports, and Quotes) database, which contains detailed information on consolidated transac? tions, quotes, the NYSE audit trail, and NYSE orders that were handled by the automated SuperDOT system.2 These data cover 144 randomly chosen issues traded on the NYSE from November 1990 through January 1991. The sample consists of orders entered during this period. It is restricted to standard (non-ticksensitive) market and limit orders, and (for reasons that will be discussed later) to day orders, i.e., orders that were marked on submission to expire at the close of the day.
C. Preliminary Analysis
It is useful to place this sample in the context of total trading activity. The NYSE accounts for 62 percent of transactions in the sample reported to the con? solidated tape and 84 percent of the consolidated trading volume. The SuperDOT system accounts for 53 percent ofthe participants in all transactions, but only 30 percent ofthe buy and sell volume (twice total volume, as conventionally reported). Of the SuperDOT orders, 50 percent are straight market orders and 45 percent are standard limit orders. The remaining 5 percent included stop orders (2 percent), market at close order (2 percent), and other more rarely used qualifications. 2The data are available to academic researchers and are documented in Hasbrouck, Sofianos, and Sosebee (1993) and Hasbrouck (1992). Table 1 profiles other characteristics ofthe SuperDOT system order flow. Buy orders are slightly more common than sell orders for both market and limit orders. A small fraction (6 percent) of orders (roughly the same for market and limit orders) are tick-sensitive.
These include "buy-minus" orders, which can only be executed on a downtick and "sell-plus" (and sell short) orders, which can only be executed on an uptick. The time-in-force attribute of an order reflects the horizon over which an order should be considered active. The majority of limit orders (82 percent) are day orders (which expire at the close ofthe day's trading session). The table also profiles the size distribution of the orders. It is particularly noteworthy that limit orders tend to be larger.
The sample consists of all market and limit orders in the System Order Database (SOD) component of the TORQ database (144 representative NYSE issues, November 1990 through January 1991). aTick-sensitive orders are buy orders that are to be executed only on a down tick and sell or sell short orders that are to be executed only on an uptick. bTime-in-force refers to the horizon over which an order is to be regarded as active. An unexecuted day order is considered canceled at the close of the day. Good-till-canceled orders remain pending indefinitely.
During the sample period, the S&P 500 Index rose 13.1 percent, perhaps in response to the unanticipated Gulf War crisis. Only 26 ofthe 63 days in the sample have negative price changes. As noted in the discussion of empirical design, this artifact induces a difference in the performance of buy and sell orders in the full sample. Table 2 reports order counts, fill percentages, and ex ante performance measures classified by side and open-to-close price change.3 Sell limit orders have higher fill rates and perform better on our ex ante measure. Not surprisingly, these differences are greatest when the market rose the most. The average fill rates and 3On days when the market is moving up, sell limit orders will more likely fill than will buy limit orders placed equally far from the market. On such days, our ex ante measure of performance, V ex ante, will indicate that sell limit orders performed better than comparable buy limit orders. Our ex post measure of performance, Vex post, will likewise indicate that executed buy limit orders performed better than comparable executed sell limit orders. These performance differences will depend on the size of the intraday price change. If the intraday price change is large, the measured differences will be quite large. Table 4 presents estimates of the fill percentage, defined as the percentage of original order volume that is executed. The unfilled remainder is usually due to price movement away from the order or cancellation. The fill rates are highest for market orders. For a limit order of a given size, the fill rate increases with limit price position: orders that are priced more aggressively achieve higher fill rates. For a given limit price position, the fill rate generally declines as order size increases: larger orders are more difficult to fill.6 Sell limit orders generally have higher fill rates than do buy limit orders placed equally far from the market. Paired r-statistics for testing equality of the mean daily fill rates indicate statistical significance in a few cases.7 The differences are greatest for the larger orders. These results are consistent with the implications of asymmetric information models that assume that large traders tend to be better informed than small traders and that buyers tend to be better informed than sellers (Easley and O'Hara (1987) and Burdett and O'Hara (1987)).
IV. Main Results
A. Fill Rates
6The fill rates for market orders are generally slightly less than 100 percent. Most of the unfilled market orders appeared to be orders that were either canceled immediately after submission or routed to the broker's booth for special handling.
7 Paired f-statistics must be used because market-wide changes in value cause the buy and sell means to be inversely correlated.
The sample consists of all market and limit orders in the System Order Database (SOD) component of the TORQ database (144 representative NYSE issues, November 1990 through January 1991) that were entered when the prevailing bid/ask spread was $!4 or less and were marked to expire at the end of the trading day. Furthermore, orders entered on November 9, 14, 27, 30, December 3, 31 of 1990, and January 10, 17, 24, 30, 31 of 1991 were excluded to ensure that the distribution of open-to-close index price changes in the analysis sample would be symmetric about zero. aThe limit price position is the extent to which the limit order price betters the existing quote. bThe "Market" order classification also includes marketable limit orders.
B.
Ex Ante Performance Measure, Pex ante Most market orders receive some price improvement. For example, sell orders of 200 shares or less submitted into a market with a $V& spread better the best bid by an average of 1.7 cents. Since $% is the minimum price variation for the sample, we may rule out executions between the quotes. The price improvement relative to the prevailing quotes reflects stopped orders that are subsequently executed at better prices (see below). The price improvement is greatest for small orders and for orders placed into markets with wide spreads. These results reflect the fact that large orders are more difficult to execute and the fact that many specialists quote The fill percentage is the total number of shares that were filled divided by the total number of shares submitted as orders. Each cell reports the mean over all 52 days in the sample of the daily fill percentage. The sample is described in the notes to Table 3 . a f-statistics (paired) for testing the equality of the buy and sell means. spreads wider than the effective spread. Sell orders generally receive slightly more price improvement, but the differences are neither statistically nor economieally significant.
Limit orders placed behind the best quote (L < $ -A and L = $ -V%) do not perform as well under the ex ante performance measure as those placed at the best quote or in the market. Most of these orders do not execute (Table 4) . The imputed end-of-day opposite-side execution price imposed by the ex ante performance measure substantially penalizes these orders. A limit order with a limit price position of L = $0 is an at-the-quote order. In a $% market, small sell orders placed at the ask better the opposite-side quote by an average of 4.5 cents per share, a gain of 2.8 cents relative to the market sell order. In moving from a market order to an at-the-quote limit order, one would expect an increase in risk as well as an increase in average gain. The standard deviations of pex ante (not rep0rted) are generally consistent with this hypothesis. For example, the standard deviation of Pex ante for an at-the-quote limit order is roughly three times as large as that of a market order. The difference is due to limit orders that failed to execute because price moved away. The ex ante performance measure imputes a fill price from the closing bid for these orders.
The ex ante order transaction cost, pexante, measures the extent to which the average price at which an order is filled betters the opposite-side quote prevailing at the time the order is submitted. For orders that are unfilled at the end of the day, a fill is imputed at the closing opposite-side quote for the day. Each cell reports the mean over all 52 days in the sample of the daily mean ex ante order transaction costs. The sample is described in the notes to Table 3 . af-statistics (paired) for testing the equality of the daily buy and sell means. Table 5 into the larger order size classes, order perfor? mance generally declines. Nevertheless, at-the-quote limit orders still appear to dominate market orders in average performance.
Moving down through
Limit orders with a given price placement perform better in markets with wide spreads than in markets with narrow spreads. For example, the mean Pex ante for small sell orders placed at the best ask in a $lA market is 8.1 cents per share, which is 3.6 cents greater than the same mean in a $/g market. The difference is due to the wider spread: the spread is the potential benefit of an execution at the ask.
When the prevailing spread is $lA, limit orders placed in the market (L > $0) perform best. These orders have a high probability of execution at prices better than the opposite quote. Within each order size and spread classification, sell limit orders usually per? form slightly better than similarly placed buy limit orders. The advantage increases somewhat as order size increases. These results provide some support for the as?
sumption that large buy orders may come from better informed traders than do sell orders. None ofthe differences in means, however, are statistically significant at a 5-percent confidence level, and most differences are not economieally significant.8 The information in this sample suggests that the processes by which buy and sell orders are filled are very similar.
The results indicate that traders place their limit orders at the prices that our analysis identifies as being most efficient. Within each classification of order size, spread, and side, the most commonly used limit order is almost always order. This is a general result for marketable limit orders found in this study, and may be a consequence of an omitted effect. Traders might be more inclined to submit marketable limit orders, for example, if observable market conditions lead them to believe that the price is likely to move away from the current quote and if they do not wish to "chase" the stock. T-tests of equality of Pex mte means in market order and marketable limit order subsamples reject equality for all order size/spread combinations. The r-statistics range between 6.9 and 11.9.
C. Stopping and the Performance of Market Orders
Price improvement for market orders in /s-point markets can arise from crossing and/or stopping. Table 6 reports summary statistics for the ex ante performance measure for market orders classified by whether or not they were stopped. In mar? kets of all spread sizes, stopped market orders receive better execution. In /s-point markets, virtually all of the improvement occurs on stopped orders. Unfortunately, the trader does not know in advance whether his order will be stopped, since stopping is generally at the discretion of the specialist at the time the order is received.
8It might appear that the lack of statistical significance is due in part to our aggregation of individual order observations into daily mean observations. At first glance, the resulting reduction in sample size might be thought to account for the weak results. A more careful analysis, however, reveals that the aggregation also decreases the variance of the data proportionately. If the distribution of order values is stable across days, and if order performance is indeed independent, the aggregation should not affect the power of the test. The lack of statistical significance is more likely due to the intraday order dependence of order performance and to the proper use of paired f-tests. Since the buy and sell ex ante performance measures are inversely correlated, the variance of their difference is greater than the sum of their variances. This inflation in variance, which reflects the lack of independent information in these two variables, decreases the power ofthe test.
A broker (generally the specialist) "stops" an order by guaranteeing execution at a specified price (generally the opposite-side quote), but endeavoring to obtain a better price. The sample comprises all market orders from the order sample described in the notes to Table 3 These results indicate that specialists raise their bid following the execution of a sell limit order by more than they lower their ask following the execution of a buy limit order. Since limit orders are generally ex? ecuted by market orders, these results suggest that specialists believe buy market orders convey more information than do sell market orders. The ex post perfor? mance of the larger market orders provides direct support for this interpretation.
Larger market buy orders performed slightly better than equally-sized market sell orders in all spread classes. These differences indicate that specialists raise their bids following a market buy order by more than they lower their asks following a market sell order. Although these differences are not statistically significant, they are consistent with better informed buyers than sellers. It should also be noted that the dealing strategies considered here are fairly simple ones that make no use of market condition information.
E. Dealing from off the
Traders who can condition their order strategies might obtain better performance.
V. Conclusions
This study examines order execution performance for a sample of New York Stock Exchange market and limit day orders with the aim of characterizing alter? native strategies. Our ex ante performance measure compares the fill price per share of an order with the quotes prevailing at the time the order was received, assuming an imputed fill for unexecuted limit orders at the closing quote. The analysis ofthe ex ante performance measure supports the following conclusions. i) Market orders frequently better the prevailing opposite-side quote.
ii) In $/g markets, at-the-quote limit orders achieve better average perfor? mance than market orders, although at the cost of higher variability.
iii) In $>4-point markets, placing limit orders at the quote is an inferior strat?
egy. Limit orders that better the quote by $% appear to perform well.
iv) The best limit order strategies were the most commonly used strategies.
The analysis of our ex post performance measure, which compares the fill price of an executed order to subsequent quotes suggests that limit orders are subject 
